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MUELLER v. COMMONWEALTH
1992 Va. LEXIS 97
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Ten-year old Charity Powers disappeared the morning of October
6, 1990. Four months later her body was found in a shallow grave near
the home of Everett Lee Mueller. Mueller was arrested and soon after
confessed to the rape and murder of the child.
Following Mueller's arrest, there was extensive media coverage of
the murder. The articles and television reports included information that
Mueller was charged with the murder of Charity Powers, that Mueller
had a record which included prior rape convictions, and that Mueller had
already confessed to the rape and murder of the victim. In support of a
motion for change of venue, Mueller provided affidavits from residents
of the county that stated that based on what they had seen or heard in the
media, they had already ascertained that Mueller was guilty. The trial
judge denied the motion.
During voirdire, the trial court refused to allow "reverse-Witherspoon
questions" that the defense asserted were necessary in order to strike for
cause those jurors who automatically would impose the death penalty if
a guilty verdict was reached. The jury which was chosen found Mueller
guilty of capital murder pursuant to Virginia Code Section 18.2-31(5)
and (8) (murder in the commission of a rape, and murder of a child under
12 in the commission of abduction). The jury also convicted Mueller of
rape and abduction with intent to defile, and it fixed his punishment at life
imprisonment with respect to each of these charges.
At the penalty stage of Mueller's trial, the defense attempted to enter
Mueller's past rape convictions into evidence to show that under Virginia
sentencing guidelines he would be ineligible for parole. The trial court
held the evidence inadmissible. After finding both "vileness" and
"future dangerousness", 1 the jury fixed the defendant's punishment at
death. After the hearing required by Section 19.2-264.5 of the Virginia
Code, the trial court imposed the sentences fixed by the jury.
Mueller appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court, claiming that the
trial court erred in not granting Mueller's change of venue motion due to
the excessive pretrial publicity; that the court erred in not allowing
reverse-Witherspoon questions during voir dire; and that the court's
suppression of Mueller's parole ineligibility evidence was incorrect.
HOLDING
The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed Mueller's conviction and
sentence.2 The court held that the claims raised by Mueller were invalid
and asserted that Mueller was not denied a fair trial based on several
factors. First, the Virginia court held that the trial judge appropriately
denied the change of venue because the record did not show that any of
the media reports were inaccurate. 3 Second, the court held that the trial
court did not err in refusing to allow the reverse-Witherspoon questions
on voir dire requested by the defendant,4 because the requested questions
I Va. Code Ann. §19.2-264.2 and §19.2-264.4(C) (1990).
2 Mueller v. Commonwealth, Nos. 920287, 920449, 1992 Va.
LEXIS 97 at '2 (Sept. 18, 1992).
3 Id. at 4"20.
4 Id. at 423.
5 Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2232-33 (1992). See case
summary of Morgan, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
6 Mueller, 1992 Va. LEXIS 97 at *39.
7 Id.
were not within the United States Supreme Court's holding in Morgan
v. Illinois.5 Finally, the court held that the trial court did not violate
Mueller's due process rights by refusing to instruct the jury that Mueller
would not be eligible for parole if convicted of the rape of Charity
Powers.6 In support of its conclusion, the Virginia court simply stated
that it had uniformly and repeatedly held that information regarding
parole eligibility is not relevant for the jury's consideration.
7
Other issues raised were decided by the court in a summary fashion
and will not be discussed. These issues include the claim that the jury's
finding of death violated the constitution's Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment Clause, that the aggravating circumstances of "vileness" set forth
in the capital murder statute is unconstitutionally vague, and that the
verdict form was defective because it did not list the mitigating factors
mentioned in the statute. 8 In addition, this article will not discuss the
Miranda issues raised by Mueller. 9
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Change of Venue
The first error Mueller asserted was that because of extensive media
coverage of the murder, he was unable to receive a fair trial in Chester-
field County and should have been granted a change of venue. Mueller
argued that because the media coverage was inflammatory and contained
information regarding his confession and his prior criminal record, the
denial of thevenue change violated his rights underthe Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.
The Virginia Supreme Court began by observing that:
[Tihere is apresumption that a defendant can receive a fair trial
from the citizens of the jurisdiction in which the offense
occurred. It is the burden of the defendant to overcome this
presumption by demonstrating that the feeling of prejudice on
the part of the citizenry is widespread and is such that would
"be reasonably certain to prevent a fair trial".1 0
The court also stated that the decision to grant a change of venue lies
within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed
unless the record affirmatively shows an abuse of discretion. t I
Although the Virginia Supreme court stated it was using the test set
forth in Stockton v. Commonwealth to justify the trial court's denial of a
change of venue, it appeared to give the "accuracy" (of media reports)
factor greater emphasis. Stockton, as stated above, requires the defen-
dant to demonstrate that the prejudice among the community was
"widespread". The facts in Mueller's case revealed that all nine jurors
discussed in the opinion had been exposed to the media coverage of the
case and a majority of the nine were aware of Mueller's confession and
prior record. A careful review of the statements of the prospective jurors
8 Id. at *8,*9.
9 For an example of the Virginia Supreme Court's approach to
Miranda issues, see King v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 353,416 S.E.2d
669 (1992). See case summary of King, Capital Defense Digest, this
issue.
10 Mueller, 1992 Va. LEXIS 97 at *19 (quoting Stockton v.
Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124,137, 314 S.E.2d 371, 380 (1984)).
11 Id. at *20.
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relating to their knowledge of the case seems to raise a colorable claim
under Stockton that prejudice - in the sense that there existed a
preexisting belief in the defendant's guilt - was, in fact, "widespread"
among the community.
In Mueller, the Virginia court seems to have somewhat altered the
meaning of prejudice which the defendant must show to overcome the
presumption of a fair trial. The Supreme Court in Mueller placed great
emphasis on whether the media reports were actually fair and accurate in
determining if a change of venue is warranted. 12 In other words, the
Virginia Supreme Court has given the "accuracy" factor of the Stockton
test new life by increasing its weight.
While the Virginia Supreme Court has held that the accuracy of the
media reports is a factor to be properly considered, the decision to change
venue remains within the trial judge's discretion. Virginia attorneys,
therefore, should continue to argue that in their particular cases, pretrial
publicity will preclude a fair trial, with "accuracy" being only one of
several factors for the trial judge to weigh in determining whether
sufficient prejudice exists. However, defense should be aware that
Mueller seems to give greater consideration to the"accuracy" factor than
before. Noting this new emphasis, attorneys should be prepared to argue
the inaccuracy of pretrial publicity while still emphasizing that accuracy
is still only one factor to be considered.
In addition, attorneys should be aware that Mueller was decided as
a state law decision. Thus, regardless of the Virginia Supreme Court's
standard, the federal constitutional requirement that ajury be capable of
rendering an impartial verdict despite pretrial publicity, set forth in Irvin
v. Dowd,13 must still be satisfied. In recognizing that there may be a
discrepancy between the Virginia Supreme Court's standard and the
federal standard, attorneys should be sure to raise the Dowd claim in
order to preserve the issue for appeal.
II. The Reverse-Witherspoon Issue: Morgan v. Illinois
The court also refused to allow certain questions on voir dire which
Mueller contended were necessary to determine whether any prospective
jurors were predisposed toward imposing the death penalty. Because the
Commonwealth, under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 14 was entitled to conduct
the opposite line of questioning, i.e., whether certain prospective jurors
were unalterably opposed to the death penalty, Mueller argued that his
questions should have been allowed. 15
In response, the Virginia Supreme Court held that "where the voir
dire questioning conducted by the trial court otherwise 'assures the
removal of those who would invariably impose capital punishment,' it is
not reversible error for the trial court to deny defense counsel additional
questions on this subject."' 16 Applying the United States Supreme
Court's ruling in Morgan for the first time, the Virginia court distin-
guished Morgan from the case at hand by stating that in Morgan the trial
court had not asked any questions on the subject of whether ajuror would
automatically impose the death penalty if the defendant was found
guilty.17
In Mueller, on the other hand, the trial court did, in fact, ask
questions which probed whether a prospectivejuror would automatically
12 Id.
13 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
14 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
15 In support Mueller relied on the United States Supreme Court's
ruling in Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S.Ct. at 2232-33, which held that a
capital defendant is entitled to ask on voir dire if a potential juror would
impose the death penalty no matter what might be presented in mitiga-
tion.
16 Mueller, 1992 Va. LEXIS 97 at *25 (citing Turner v. Common-
wealth, 221 Va. 513,523 (1980)).
vote for the death penalty. One of the difficulties may have been that the
questions proposed by Mueller's attorney on the reverse-Witherspoon
issue were confrontational. His questions were worded in such a way that
challenged and provoked the jurors, instead of simply exposing their
biases. For example, Mueller's attorney asked: "Ifyou sitin the guilt
phase of the trial and you determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr.
Mueller raped and abducted and killed a 10 year old girl, and then you sit
in the sentencing phase and listened to the evidence in aggravation and
the evidence in mitigation, aren't you going to think the only appropriate
sentence is death?"
Morgan was primarily aimed at exposing biases ofjurors and their
ability to consider mitigating evidence. The Court in Morgan stated that
"based on the requirement of impartiality embodied in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a capital defendant may challenge
for cause any prospectivejuror who maintains such views [an inclination
to automatically impose the death penalty]." 18 Thus, defense attorneys
must carefully formulate their questions in advance and be prepared to
defend them based on Morgan. For example, defense counsel might
attempt to ask a reverse-Witherspoon question by asking, "Would your
beliefs about the death penalty impede you from considering a life
sentence where you found the defendant guilty of raping and murdering
a ten year old girl?" This type of question is less confrontational and
probes the properMorgan issue of exposing ajuror's inability to consider
mitigating evidence.19
Finally, attorneys should be aware that it is at this stage in the
proceedings thatjurors get their first impression of theattorneys involved
inthetrial. Thus, the manner in which questions arephrased to jurors will
bear on their attitudes towards the attorneys throughout the course of the
trial. A hostile examination of jurors while conducting voir dire may
serve as a detriment to the defense attorney.
Ill. Refusal to Allow Parole Ineligibility Information
The Virginia Supreme Court also upheld the trial judge's refusal to
allow evidence that Mueller would not be eligible for parole under
Virginia law if given a life sentence because he would have been
convicted for rape three times. The court noted that it had held uniformly
and repeatedly that information regarding parole eligibility is not rel-
evant for the jury's consideration.
20
Notwithstanding the merits of Virginia's established rule of inad-
missibility of parole eligibility,21 the Virginia Supreme Court did not
address the fact that Mueller's ineligibility evidence was being proffered
not as mitigating evidence, but to rebut future dangerousness. The
Commonwealth had used Mueller's past parole violations to help estab-
lish that the defendant would be a "future danger" to society. By refusing
to admit evidence that Mueller would never have been eligible for
parole, the court did not give the defense an opportunity to rebut this
aggravating evidence. Thus, the state's introduction of Mueller's past
parole violations to establish future dangerousness should have given
Mueller the opportunity to show that he would never actually be paroled.
Defense should argue that in this type of situation, the court must
allow ineligibility evidence to be introduced, as the prosecution has
17 Id. at *25.
18 Morgan, 112 S.Ct. at 2226.
19 For a discussion of other voir dire techniques, see case summary
of Morgan, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
20 Mueller, 1992 Va. LEXIS 97 at *39.
21 For a general discussion of the parole ineligibility issue, see
Straube, The Capital Defendant and Parole Eligibility, Capital Defense
Digest, this issue. See also Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364,
402,402 S.E.2d 218 (1991); and case summary of Quesinberry, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol.4 No.1., p.23, 25 (1991).
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already opened the door to admitting parole-related evidence. Attorneys
should heavily rely on Gardner v. Florida,2 2 which gives the defendant
a general right to introduce evidence that rebuts evidence relied upon by
the state to justify the death penalty. Moreover, in Skipper v. South
Carolina23 JusticePowell's concurring opinion made clearthat although
22 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
23 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
certain evidence might not normally be admitted in mitigation, it must be
allowed in order to rebut the state's aggravating evidence.
Summary and analysis by:
Lesley Meredith James
KING v. COMMONWEALTH
243 Va. 353, 416 S.E.2d 669 (1992)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On October 8, 1990, Danny Lee King, recently released on parole,
and his wife by a bigamous marriage, Becky Hodges King, stole a van.
Three days later, they lured Carolyn Horton Rogers, a real estate agent,
into a vacant house in a residential section of Roanoke. Later that
afternoon, Ms. Rogers was discovered murdered in the basement of the
house. The evidence indicated that Rogers had been struck continuously
about the head and face, choked, thrown against a wall, and finally
stabbed in the chest. King and Becky took Roger's jewelry, checkbook,
and car. On October 15th, King and Becky were arrested in the stolen van
in Ohio. While Becky was immediately charged with the capital murder
of Carolyn Rogers, King was arrested only for violating parole.
Although King was not formally being held in connection with Ms.
Roger's murder, the police made two investigatory visits to King in order
to get hair and blood specimens, foot impressions, and handwriting
samples. During those visits, which took place on November 1 st and 9th
of 1990, King indicated that he wanted to talk about the murder of Ms.
Rogers. After being read his Miranda rights, King said he would make
a statement about the case if the officers would appoint an attorney for
him and arrange a meeting with his lawyer, Becky's lawyer, the
Commonwealth's attorney, and the officers.
In both instances, the officers replied that because King was not
charged with the murder of Ms. Rogers, counsel could not be appointed.
OfficerKern said to King on November I st, that hedid not"have any way
of appointing him [an attorney] at [that] particular time," but suggested
that King could retain his own attorney. King made a similar request and
received a similar response during the November 9th meeting. After his
request was denied, during both the November 1st and 9th visits, King
made statements to the police which later proved to be incriminating.
King finally was charged with the Rogers murder on January 4,
1991, and was convicted of capital murder in the commission of a
robbery. At the sentencing phase of the trial, King attempted to introduce
evidence that he would not be eligible for parole for at least thirty years,
but the trial court refused to admit the evidence. 1 The jury convicted
King of capital murder in the commission of robbery while armed with
a deadly weapon, and fixed his punishment at death.2 King's co-
defendant, Becky Hodges King, received five consecutive twelve month
I However, the court did admit evidence of unadjudicated acts as
aggravating evidence. For example, an unadjudicated theft charge,
King's bigamous marriage, and incidents of violent behavior in his
wife's home were relied upon by the Commonwealth.
2 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(4) (1990). Thejury also convicted King
of robbery, two offenses of forgery, and two offenses of uttering, with
punishment fixed at life imprisonment for robbery and ten years'
imprisonment for each of the other four non-capital offenses.
3 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
sentences as a result of her involvement in the case.
King's appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court alleged that his
statements to the police on November 1st and 9th should have been
suppressed because they were obtained in violation of Edwards v.
Arizona,3 that the trial court erred by not allowing him to introduce
evidence of his parole ineligibility, and that his sentence was excessive




The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's rulings
regarding the admission of his statements on several grounds: (1) that
because adversarial judicial proceedings had not begun, King's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel had not attached; (2) King had failed to
unequivocally assert his right to counsel; and (3) the officers had not
engaged in "interrogation" within Miranda's meaning.5 As to evidence
of parole eligibility, the court affirmed its earlier rulings that such
evidence is inadmissible. 6 Finally, the court concluded that King's
sentence was not disproportionate or excessive, even though his co-




In King and the recent capital case of Eaton v. Commonwealth,8 the
Virginia Supreme Court addressed police behavior apparently designed
to circumvent defendant's Sixth Amendment and Miranda rights to
counsel.
A. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
In finding that King's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not
been violated, the court placed a great deal of weight on the fact that King
had not yet formally been charged with the murder at the time of the
investigatory visits.9 In Arizona v. Roberson, the U.S. Supreme Court
distinguished Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel by stating
4 King also argued that the evidence was insufficient to show that
he, rather than Becky, his co-defendant, committed the murder. The
court dismissed this claim, and it will not be discussed in this summary.
5 King v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 353,360,416 S.E.2d 669,672
(1992).
6 Id. at 368, 416 S.E.2d at 677.
7 Id. at 369-372, 416 S.E.2d at 677-679.
8 240 Va. 236, 397 S.E.2d 385 (1990).
9 King, 243 Va. at 360,416 S.E.2d at 672.
